Abstract: This paper sets up a model to account for differences in total factor productivity due to differences in enforcement of contracts. Vertical specialization generates the need for intra-period credit, because final goods producers cannot pay their intermediate goods suppliers before they produce their final good. The paper shows that if there are enforcement problems, the capital distribution is skewed in the sense that intermediate goods producers operate at lower capital levels and higher marginal products of capital than final goods producers. This wedge is created by the price for intermediate goods, which is lower in economies with bad enforcement. For this reason, the high-productivity firms in the intermediate goods sector have no incentive to grow and the low-productivity firms in the final goods sector, benefiting from low intermediate goods prices, have no incentive to shrink, which causes productivity to be lower in countries with bad enforcement.
Introduction
Why are certain countries poor and stay that way? The neoclassical growth model predicts that poor countries, even if living in autarky from the rest of the world, should rapidly catch up to industrialized countries. In the presence of perfect international capital markets this process would even take place instantaneously as capital flows to the countries with low capital endowment and high interest rates in order to equalize interest rates across countries.
All this requires that technology across countries is identical. Prescott (1997) therefore raises the point that a theory explaining differences in production functions across nations, in particular differences in total factor productivity, is needed. This paper attempts to develop a theory of differences in TFP that have their origin in incomplete contract enforcement.
We set up a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine the role played by incomplete enforcement of intra-period trade credit contracts. Output is produced in a sequence of intermediate production stages. Due to a benefit to specialization every firm concentrates its activity to the production of one single stage. Firms in each stage except the initial one purchase the intermediate good of the previous stage using trade credit and sell their output to the firms in the next stage, receiving trade credit of that firm in exchange. That is, rather than looking at enforcement problems pertaining to long term borrowing contracts we look at default risk within the chain 1 of intra-period trade credit.
A real world example for this chain of credit would be the two intermediate goods:
iron ore and steel, and the final good automobiles. Iron ore is an input in the steel production and steel is an input in the automobile production. The model implicitly assumes that there is a benefit to specialization, that is, every firm in this economy specializes in only one sector of the economy. Car producers, therefore, would never buy iron ore to produce the steel themselves. Instead they purchase steel in the intermediate goods market.
There is, by the way, plenty of evidence that vertical specialization in the real world is far more advanced than the relatively coarse grid of intermediate stages iron ore -steel -automobiles. Kei-Mu Yi (2001) shows that there is specialization even across countries that can account for the recent boost to international trade. He shows that effects of declines in tariffs are magnified if intermediate goods cross the border several times. Given that producers are even willing to pay tariffs by shipping goods across borders several times clearly indicates that there must be some payoff to specialization.
Why do firms use trade credit? Notice that in a standard macro model with a sequence of intermediate goods as described above there would be no borrowing and lending other than potential long term borrowing contracts for financing of firms. In this paper however, I assume that the intra-period timing of production stages requires 2 intra-period debt contracts. To stay with the iron ore-steel-automobile example, the stage 1 producer hands over 100 units of iron ore to the steel producer. Let the relative price of iron ore to cars be 0.2, then the steel producer pays with a promise to deliver 20 cars. Next, the steel producer produces 100 units of steel and sells it to the car manufacturer at a relative price of 0.5, that is, he gets a promise from the car manufacturer over 50 cars. Next, the car manufacturer uses the steel to make 100 cars. He then gives 50 cars to the steel manufacturer who in turn gives 20 cars to the iron ore producer. In the model there is default risk on the obligations of the automobile producer and the steel producer. More precisely, contracts have to be designed to be individually rational, that is, in such a way that the car manufacturer does not decide to run away without paying 50 cars to the steel producer and the steel producer does not run away without handing over 20 cars as payment for the iron ore he received.
The timing of production creates debt relationships that would not exist in a macro model where one assumes that factor payments, production, revenues, and profits all occur simultaneously. In my model the firm that produces first, receives its factor payments and therefore, its profits, last. Note that the total amount of intra-period debt outstanding increases with the number of production stages. Intra-period debt can reach any multiple of final production, if we add enough stages. Suppose there were N different stages and the relative price of stage i is i/N. The trade credit of a 3 firm in sector i it owes to the sector i − 1 firms is then (i − 1) /N. The total amount of debt relative to the final product is then N i = 1
. This is quite intuitive: The more stages we use for production the more leveraged firms become with respect to their intermediate goods purchases, and consequently the amount of credit relative to output increases.
There is some evidence that trade credit in fact plays a big role in the real world, in particular in developing countries. Cardoso (2002) points out that of all firms in Mexico that use credit, 40% use trade credit as their main source of financing.
According to Ickes (1998) promissory notes, called veksels, are very wide spread in Russia. Large enterprises like natural gas or oil producers purchase inputs like machinery with notes denominated in natural gas or oil for a number of reasons: First, the exact same timing problem as mentioned above applies and the veksel gives the ability to pay for inputs before the firm's own production and revenue take place.
Second, promissory notes are the perfect tax evasion vehicles for firms that face essentially 100% marginal tax rates, which is the case in many developing countries.
Third, firms might not be able to get large cash loans from a bank due the bank's fear that funds are diverted offshore and never paid back.
The main theoretical result is that with identical initial capital endowments a country with poor enforcement will end up in a lower steady state than a country with effective enforcement. The risk of default on credit induces two distinct chan- 
Model
The model I consider is an extremely stylized environment with infinite horizon and no uncertainty. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...
The economy is populated by a measure one of infinitely-lived households who have preferences over consumption streams {c
representable as:
where 0 < β < 1 and u satisfies the usual Inada conditions. Each household has a production technology and an initial capital and labor endowment (k The output of a sector 1 firm is:
where f satisfies the usual assumptions:
Output in sector 2, the final goods sector, is a function of both capital and interme-
That is, in order to produce one unit of the final good, a firm has to purchase at least one unit of the intermediate good. Moreover, firms face a borrowing constraint of the following form:
The function h is given exogenously and specifies -as a function of a firm's capitalhow much credit it can get. The function h is assumed to be increasing in the capital level, reflecting the assumption that larger firms are able to get more trade credit. 
7
Additional assumptions on h will be necessary later in this section, once we introduce some more structure.
The within-period timing works as follows. First, firms decide in which sector they want to produce. Notice that firms make this decision every period, that is, they can switch between sectors over time. Second, sector 1 produces its output. Third, Sector The equilibrium concept used in this paper is that of recursive competitive equilibrium and the precise definition can be found in Appendix 1. Just for reference purposes, here is the firm's problem in sequential form:
subject to:
That is, sector 2 households can get trade credit of at most h(k). Given p t , the price for intermediate goods, the firm makes its choice between the two sectors, and makes the savings versus consumption decision. The function h is chosen in such a way that there is a critical capital level 0 ≤k ≤ ∞ with
which means that for capital levels low enough the trade credit constraint always binds.
Equilibrium Properties: Steady States
This section is going to characterize steady state equilibria. Let's start with the case of no enforcement problems as a benchmark:
3.1 The case of no enforcement problems:k = 0
Proof. In either case p < Proposition 2 The steady state capital level is equal for all firms and given by:
The steady state capital level is then identical to the one in a standard neoclassical growth model as stated above. 
For sector 2 firms the Euler condition takes the following form:
and a market clearing condition:
In addition, firms must prefer to produce in their sector, that is, a firm holding capital k i must find it in its best interest to produce in sector i rather than in sector 3 − i :
Clearly, the three equations and two inequalities are not enough to pin down the steady state allocation. Later in this section we show that there are indeed multiple steady states.
The numerical examples in this section all use the following functional forms:
, sector 2 firms are borrowing constrained. They could potentially produce Ak α , but they only get trade credit for qk γ which limits their production to exactly qk γ . One can think of A as being the TFP in the production and q being the TFP in the enforcement technology.
Evidently, larger firms can borrow more in absolute terms, but also the share of trade credit relative to its own production capacity becomes larger: 13 they would like to. They could produce more cars but are able to only buy a limited number of engines. Therefore, part of their capital is effectively idle. Due to the low price for engines however, this is still more profitable than producing engines themselves. Finally, large firms who are unconstrained choose between producing f (k) engines and f (k) cars. They go for car production because of the low price for engines.
Next one can show an interesting result about the source of the reduction in steady state output of economies with poor enforcement compared to the perfect enforcement case. Apart from the obvious inefficiency due to sector 2 firms producing h(k) < f(k), there is another channel for inefficiency:
Proposition 3 There are steady state equilibria with output, consumption, and welfare lower than in an economy with perfect enforcement in which f (k
is, there is no waste due to strictly binding borrowing constraints. 
This result demonstrates that the inefficiency occurs even in situations in which
, that is, in steady state sector 2 firms operate at full capacity and the borrowing constraint is not limiting the amount of output produced. The lower output in this case is due to the low price for intermediate goods: As mentioned in the introduction, Sector 1 producers have a high marginal product but do not accumulate more capital because of the low price they receive for their product. On the other hand, capital is wasted in the final goods sector because it is operating at high capital levels with low marginal products. Essentially one can think of this as an externality: The marginal product -which is what a social planner would care about -is different from the marginal profit of capital due to a price p < 1 2 , in particular, the social marginal product of sector 2 capital is very low, but since intermediate goods are so inexpensive the personal marginal profit of capital is high and capital is over-accumulated in sector 2. To be precise:
Another way to see the inefficiency is the following: If k p e A are, the stronger is the effect of the credit constraint in steady state.
Next, let's go through a numerical example to see how macro-economic variables depend on the choice of parameters. We use the same example as in the previous proposition, but with varying values for the parameter q which can be viewed as a measure for the enforcement technology. High values for q make the credit constraint less binding, whereas low values of q cause the region in which sector 2 firms are credit constrained to become larger.
Moreover, the example demonstrates that there can be multiple steady states.
Consequently, for each variable we compute the minimum and the maximum value relative to the perfect enforcement case. Numerically this is easy to do: On a grid between 0 and 1 2 for the price p one can compute the steady state capital levels in the two sectors by using the Euler conditions. After that one has to check that firms with capital k i would actually prefer producing in sector i. The distribution of capital, that is, the value for µ follows directly from the market clearing condition. 
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For the remainder of the paper it is assumed that the function h takes a particular form:
that is, firms can get trade credit up to a certain share of their capital holdings.
This assumption simplifies the analysis because now it is certain that in steady state either the first best outcome is achieved where constraints are not binding and both sectors operate at the same capital level, or firms operate at different capital levels and sector 2 firms operate at the kink point k , where h(k) = f (k). This happens because the Euler condition in sector 2 can never be satisfied in the linear part of the profit function:
The reason for multiplicity of steady states is of course the non-concavity of the profit function. Because of this there is an incentive to borrow and lend capital, but not necessarily between firms of different capital levels but among firms with the same capital level, namely those producing at levels in the non-concave region of the profit function. Firms of different capital levels have no incentive to borrow and lend in steady state because
is equalized between the two sectors. However, if firms have a k such that
they could be better off by pooling their capital and opening a share of λ firms of size
. This can also be viewed as share λ of firms each
. One can easily check that at the end of the period all firms make identical profit λπ (k
Naturally, the k 
and there is a k
such that the slope of the linear portion in the profit function in figure 3 is equal to 1/β − 1 + δ.
Proof. In the appendix.
Notice that the k
in the proposition are the capital levels used in production. The result still allows for multiplicity of capital ownership, though. In other words, uniqueness applies only to the macro-economic variables output, aggregate capital level, and the price level but not to the capital distribution.
Going through the same type of numerical exercise as in the previous section, this time with γ = 1.0, we can again plot output, capital, and implicit TFP relative to the perfect enforcement case as a function of the enforcement parameter q, but now for the one unique steady state. This is done in Figure 4 . at the cost of capital levels that are higher by about 100%. Depreciation therefore pushes the amount of output dedicated to consumption below its level under perfect enforcement.
Conclusion
To use the language of Prescott (1997) , this paper develops a theory of differences in TFP through differences in enforcement of contracts. Precisely, this paper looks at incomplete enforcement of intra-period debt, which can be thought of as trade credit.
The necessity for this intra-period borrowing comes from the timing of the production process: Sector 1 output is produced first and it is employed as an intermediate good in the sector 2 production process, so that sector 2 has an intra-period financing need to pay for intermediate goods before its own production takes place.
If there is risk of default on this intra-period credit we can show a number of results:
Prices for intermediate goods are lower in economies with imperfect enforcement of intra-period credit. This causes a skewed capital distribution with many small firms operating at high marginal products of capital and a few large firms that are very unproductive. The reason is that the credit constraint encourages sector 2 producers to operate at relatively large capital levels, and the low productivity is offset by high profit margins in that sector. The misallocation of capital from small firms into one sector that operates at low productivity causes TFP to be lower than in the perfect enforcement economy.
In the benchmark economy without capital markets, the profit function is nonconcave, which gives rise to the possibility of multiple steady states. Opening capital markets goes half-way in solving this problem: Aggregate values in steady state, including capital used in the two sectors, are uniquely pinned down. However, the capital ownership distribution is still not uniquely determined.
Appendix 1: Equilibrium definition
In order to define a recursive equilibrium, here is some preliminary work: Let A be the set of possible capital holdings (for example A = R + + would be an adequate choice) and B(A) be the Borel σ-algebra of A. Let M be the set of all probability measures on the measurable space M = (A, B(A) ) . Let Φ ∈ M denote the distribution of firms' capital. Now the household's problem in recursive formulation is:
where H : M → M is the law of motion for the capital distribution, and the function p (Φ) is the market clearing price for capital distribution Φ.
Finally we can specify what an equilibrium is:
Definition 6 A recursive equilibrium is:
• A value function v : A × M → R.
• Policy functions for next period's capital k : A × M → R and for consumption c : A × M → R.
• A pricing function p : M → R.
• A law of motion for capital distributions: H : M → M.
such that:
• v, k , c are measurable with respect to B(A).
• v satisfies the Bellman equation.
• k , c and the sector choices are the optimal decision rules.
• Decision rule k generates the aggregate law of motion for capital.
• Sector choices generate market clearing in intermediate and final goods.
Remark 7 This equilibrium definition is a little bit sloppy, because in equilibrium it is possible that market clearing can only be achieved with randomization across the two sectors. This would be the case if there is a point mass of firms being indifferent between the two sectors, and these firms would potentially have to randomize between the two sectors in order for markets to clear. To address this eventuality one would have to introduce another policy function s : A × M → [0, 1] that specifies the probability of choosing sector 1, but the notation would get rather messy.
Appendix 2: Uniqueness of steady state
In the economy with the (weakly) concave profit function steady state capital levels that firms own may not be unique, however the capital levels used in production are unique. We need to prove that there is a unique 3-tuple (p, k All we have to show is that y has a single root on the interval 0,
2
Notice that y is continuous and decreasing in p and:
, by assumption on q > f k − qk = f k − h k = 0, by definition ofk.
